


Arab Armies of the Middle East Wars 1948-73

Text by JOHN LAFFIN

Colour plates by

MIKE CHAPPELL



MEN-AT-ARMS SERIES

EDITOR: MARTIN WINDROW

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The difficulties of publishing hard information about the Middle East Wars are well known; many Arabs consider themselves to be still at war, and the requirements of both security and propaganda present major obstacles to the objective writer. This former limitation applies particularly to the identification of specific units and their insignia. While Osprey are confident that this book represents a considerable advance over previously published material, it is inevitable that some areas are still obscure. The tables of units involved in the various campaigns have been compiled from a number of sources, and cross-checking has not always been possible. Interested readers will find the titles listed on p. 39 of value. The major work by Brigadier El-Edroos is particularly relevant; although a 'commissioned' history, and therefore to be approached with care, it covers a far wider area than its title might suggest, and in great depth. The editor has leaned heavily upon Brig. El-Edroos's tables of unit deployment.

A Study in Martial Development

The major Arab armies involved in the Middle East wars are those of Egypt, Syria and Jordan, while those of Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Algeria have played smaller rôles. The Palestine Liberation Army, for a long time under Egyptian control and later under the Syrians, was also in action; but the *fedayeen* or guerrillas of the Palestine Liberation Organisation have seen much more combat than the regular soldiers of the PLA.

The enemy in nearly all cases has been Israel. Exceptions were the civil war in Yemen, in which an Egyptian Army fought the Yemeni royalists; and the Jordanian civil war of 1970-71, when King Hussein drove the PLO forces from Jordan in fierce and bloody fighting.

The modern wars of the Middle East began in 1947, when the Syrians, Egyptians, Jordanians and Lebanese were unofficially at war with the Jewish settlers of Palestine. On 15 May, the day after Israel was declared a sovereign state, the Arab invasion began. Between then and 1973 five wars occurred: those of 1948; 1956 (the Sinai War); 1967 (the Six-Day War); 1968-70 (the War of Attrition) and 1973 (the October War, better known to the Egyptians as The Great Crossing). There has also been an intermittent terrorist war, with certain peak periods—1955-56, 1964-69, 1978-81.

The 1956 war was wholly between Israel and Egypt; the 1968-70 war was mainly fought between Israel and Egypt, but Syria was also involved.

Much foreign military influence (as well as political interference) is evident in the Middle

East wars. For instance, the Egyptian Army of 1948 was largely British-equipped and fought by British methods; many officers had served with Egyptian units attached to the British Army during the desert campaigns of 1940-43. The Syrian and Lebanese forces were equipped in 1947-48 with the weapons of their former colonial masters, the French, and they used French tactics. The teeth of the Jordanian Army were the Arab Legion, British-led, trained and armed.

By 1967 the Egyptians and Syrians were Russian-equipped and Soviet military doctrine increasingly made itself felt, particularly in the pre-1973 period. During the War of Attrition the Egyptian Army was largely a Russian creation, and for the Russians the war was an opportunity



Men of Egypt's first paratroop battalion, photographed in Cairo during the first anniversary celebrations of the revolutionary regime, 1953. One man holds up a portrait of Gen. Naguib. Note large berets, light khaki drill battledress uniform, and chevrons in arm-of-service colour. The helmets and harness are British. (BBC Hulton Picture Library)



The Egyptian Camel Corps take part in a parade through Cairo in 1953. Most of these soldiers were Nubians or Sudanese, and they provided contingents which saw action in both 1948-49 and 1956. (BBC Hulton Picture Library)

to experiment with new weapons, armour and equipment. The 1973 war was fought basically between American equipment used by the Israelis and Soviet equipment used by the Egyptians and Syrians. The great tank battles of the Sinai Desert and the Golan Heights were super-power battles by proxy.

Considering that their aim has always been to crush Israel, the Arabs have, collectively, suffered from lack of unified command. Generally they have not even co-operated with one another but have simply fought separate wars at the same time. A central command has been attempted. In 1956 Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria planned 'united defence' and proposed war against Israel at a summit meeting in Cairo. King Hussein refused to give up his British subsidy, and the idea collapsed. In 1964 leaders of the 13 Arab League nations (22 in 1981) met in Cairo and formed the Unified Arab High Command. This collapsed under the

Israeli onslaught on 5 June 1967, but Nasser revived it in April 1968 when he appointed Lt. Gen. Talat Hassan as Chief-of-Staff of the U.A.H.C., freshly designed to mobilise, co-ordinate and direct the efforts of the 115 million Arabs against Israel. However, U.A.H.C. never did function at more than theoretical level.

As national armies the Arab forces have had other built-in handicaps. At root is the psycho-religious Islamic belief of *Bismillah*—'If Allah wills'. This makes training in leadership practically irrelevant and, until the 1970s, it undermined planning. As late as the 1960s some generals rejected serious planning as irreligious, on the grounds that such activity questioned Allah's omnipotence.

Two other shortcomings are the great gulf separating the officers from the troops, and the lack of a sound NCO structure. The two are related. The officers, particularly in Egypt, come from the upper classes and did not, until the 1970s, consider it part of their duty to train with the troops. This placed on the NCOs a responsibility beyond their education and status.

Illiteracy is another handicap: the majority of Egyptian and Syrian soldiers, until recently, could not read simple instructions. This presented great difficulties in the training of tank crews, for instance.

Fictitious operational reporting, from the field to HQ, and from there to the Executive is a standard problem for Arab armies. Commanders

in the field either fabricate successes or, to justify failure, exaggerate the size of enemy forces. Each day a war goes on the worse the confusion becomes. Field commanders do not obey orders because they know that they are based on fanciful misinformation which they themselves originally sent in. Other officers avoid carrying out orders and try to act independently according to information





Egyptian artillerymen man Soviet 122mm guns, used in 1948-49 and 1956: with a six-man crew, this weapon had a range of 11,800m. (Author's collection)

that seems to them to be correct. When High Command gets any sort of adverse report it delays passing it on to the Executive. In June 1967, the Egyptian General Staff did not tell President Nasser the terrible results of the Israeli air attack for eight hours.

A morale problem is that Egyptians and Syrians have had no incentive to join the services, and for most families a call-up was a calamity. Pay was minimal and there was no allowance for families, who were left destitute if the soldier was killed. The situation in Jordan was different; here soldiering was a genuine profession from the time of King Abdullah, father of King Hussein. The Jordanian Army was the most professional Arab army in 1948 and remains so in 1982, though numerically it is one of the smallest.

Since 1948 the armies of the confrontation states—those possessing borders with Israel—have increased dramatically in size. In 1947 Egypt could send an army of only 10,000 against Israel; in 1973 100,000 men were committed and Egypt still had another 400,000, including reserves. Simultaneously the armament of the Arab armies increased so dramatically that Syria and Egypt, as allies, were able to fight the greatest tank battles in history during the 1973 war. The Soviets and the Warsaw Pact countries provide their Arab clients with the most sophisticated weapons of war—and they, through oil wealth, have been able to pay for

them. The Arab forces also use French, British, German, Italian, Belgian and even Swiss equipment. More recently the Egyptians and Jordanians have acquired American material.

Until the 1973 war Israel enjoyed a qualitative advantage over its Arab enemies, while the Arabs had a greater manpower. In that war the qualitative difference narrowed, not only in weapons and equipment but also in the competence of senior commanders and the prowess of the ordinary soldiers. Their potential as soldiers was, until the 1973 war, often under-estimated. The Russians made it clear, when they were creating the modern Egyptian Army, that they considered that Egyptian soldiers were untrainable. Arab military courage, too, has been derided. But even when soldiers have run away their flight has been more an indictment of craven leadership than a confession of cowardice. Egyptian *fellaheen* and Syrian peasants make good soldiers when competently led and adequately encouraged. The Bedouin Jordanian is a natural warrior, while the Palestinian 'commando' has been indoctrinated with a fanatical bravery.

For the Western student of war and armies the Arab forces which have fought Israel provide a fascinating study in martial development, from the relatively primitive in 1947-48 to the ultra-advanced of 1973. Since the end of the Second World War only the Israelis themselves have had as much significant combat experience as the Egyptians, Syrians, Jordanians and Palestinians.

The Americans learnt much in Korea (1950-53) and in Vietnam (1965-73) as did the British in

Cyprus, Kenya, Malaya, Korea, the Gulf and Malaysia. But these combat experiences involved a type of fighting which the British and Americans are unlikely to see in a European conflict. The Arab armies, kept to a sharp fighting pitch by their unceasing perception of enmity with Israel, strive harder to improve their standard than do the NATO and Warsaw Pact nations, locked in a stand-off mentality.

The Egyptian Experience

The Egyptian forces have been subject to several different influences since the 1940s. Originally established, armed and trained by the British, they were later equipped with Eastern-bloc weapons, influenced by German military principles, and finally equipped with Soviet weapons and advised by Soviet experts. These sometimes conflicting influences were not conducive to an even development.

The Egyptian Army began the 1948 war with a

paper strength of 50,000, although the actual number of effectives was much lower. For the invasion of Israel in May that year the Army could put together only 10,000 men, though they were well armed. By late 1948 the field army was 40,000-strong, including volunteers from Sudan, Tunisia and Libya.

But to European eyes the Egyptian Army was a rabble. It could hardly have been anything else when army policy was that officers must be looked after first—and then the horses. What became of the soldiers was irrelevant. Often their weapons would not fire, and shells either exploded at the wrong time or did not explode at all.

Weight of numbers gave the Egyptians some local victories against the 'scratch' Israeli army, but even a few score determined defenders on a kibbutz sometimes held up for days an Egyptian brigade supported by tanks. After the débâcle of defeat King Farouk's army commanders sought foreign military experts who could make the Egyptian soldiery into an army. They chose

Egyptian infantry operating Czech flamethrowers: normally two men work as a team, and the large unidentified arm-patch worn by the man on the right suggests that he is the section NCO. Respirators are carried. The weapon, which has a range of 40m, is ignited by ten phosphorus bullets fitted into the rim of the muzzle. (Author's collection)





Egyptian infantryman with Russian-made 82mm recoilless gun, effective up to 800m; note sight box and oil can on ground beneath tripod. On the soldier's back can be seen his slung Kalashnikov, and an entrenching tool handle; and note pattern of helmet cover. (Author's collection)

Germans; the German reputation for military ability had not suffered from the defeat of 1945 and officers were readily available. Under a former artillery general, Wilhelm Fahrmbacher, German experts worked in Egypt between 1950 and 1957, but their number never exceeded 60. The parachute and commando units were trained in the 1950s by Gerhard Mertins, who became notorious for the command with which he would conclude a march through the desert. On the way back to barracks, near the Pyramids of Giza, he would shout: 'Over the pyramids! Quick march!' And he meant it; the already exhausted soldiers had to scramble up one side of the great pyramid of Cheops and down the other.

The modern Egyptian Army really dates from July 1952, when the so-called Free Officers seized power in a coup and set up the Revolution Command Council. The nominal head was Gen. Muhammed Naguib, but the effective leader was Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser. In April 1954 Nasser

pushed out Naguib and became Prime Minister; two years later he was President.

Up to this time Britain had been the major military influence in Egypt and the army was built very much on British lines. When the British evacuated the Canal Zone, in 1954-55, Nasser turned to Czechoslovakia to replace Britain as Egypt's arms supplier.

1956

Egypt's next war—the 'Suez Campaign' to the British—was against Israel, Britain and France, though the Anglo-French involvement is irrelevant here. Egypt, with Syria and Jordan, planned a war against Israel to support the intensive terrorist operations being mounted from Gaza, then part of Egypt. The proposed war was a foolish venture because the army still did not know how to use its newly arriving Soviet arms and equipment, and the change-over from British to Soviet military doctrine confused all ranks.

Israel struck first, on 29 October, and by 1 November the war was practically decided. One of the bloodiest actions took place at Mitla Pass, which the Israelis attacked with paratroops. The Egyptians fought well and killed 40 Israelis before they lost their hold on the Pass. Nasser ordered his forces in Sinai to withdraw, and within a few hours the withdrawal became a rout as Israeli planes strafed the Egyptian convoys. A train left El Arish carrying Egyptian officers only, while the soldiers were abandoned to shift for themselves on foot. The war ended on 7 November.

Maj. Gen. Abdel Amer's army lost several thousand dead, 6,000 captured and an immense quantity of tanks, guns, ammunition, vehicles and equipment. The British and French, after a landing at Suez, were forced by US and UN pressure to withdraw, and Nasser won this phase of the war by default. This deluded the Egyptians into thinking that they had won the entire war—a fantasy which was to have profound military consequences. With Britain and France discredited in Egypt the way was open for the Soviet Union, which not only provided funds for the Aswan High Dam but equipment for the armed forces. Russian advisers arrived in great numbers, and 25 years later their influence on tactics was still evident.

Nasser's ambition was to lead the African, Arab and Islamic world, and he provided the resources for revolution in other countries. In February 1958 Syria and Egypt combined in the 'United Arab Republic'—even sharing Army command for a time. The Kingdom of Yemen also joined, but the alliance collapsed in October 1961.

Egyptian intrigue caused the fall of the royal house of Yemen in September 1962, and Nasser sent an army of 20,000 there to support the new republican regime. Saudi Arabia backed the Yemeni royalists and the result was a ferocious and costly five-year war (in which, incidentally, the Egyptians used gas). By March 1965 Egypt had 62,000 troops holding the coastal plain, but generally failing to take the initiative from the royalists. Often they were besieged and had to be supplied by air. Through air superiority the Egyptians caused immense damage to royalist bases; but the Egyptian Army was eventually withdrawn in the wake of the Six-Day War and in

return for great subsidies—a form of bribe—from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

1967

The 1967 war—the Six-Day War—was the price President Nasser paid for his own rhetoric. At the peak of his popularity, Nasser believed that he had irresistibly powerful forces: the Russians, who had equipped the Egyptians, assured him that this was so. They believed that by bringing Egypt into confrontation with Israel they would make Nasser even more dependent on his Soviet ally.

The Army was indeed strong—100,000 men organised in five infantry divisions, each with its own tank unit, as well as two additional armoured

Russian Zyl truck with 30 × 130mm rocket tubes mounted— the entire salvo can be fired in eight seconds. The truck is camouflaged in sand and green, with a red triangular marking on the doors. This type of equipment has been in service with the Egyptian Army since the beginning of the 1970s. Those with a taste for minutiae of uniform will note the double-buckle boots worn by the co-driver. (Author's collection)



divisions. Concentrating his armour on the border, Nasser believed, would strain Israel's defence capacities. If the Israelis did attack they would have to restrict themselves to small-scale operations, and Egypt could react in force and prove to the doubting Arab nations that the Egyptian Army could beat Israel.

It has been suggested that Nasser did not want war; but he started an irreversible chain of events when he closed the Straits of Tiran and demanded the withdrawal of the UN Emergency Force in the Sinai. Also, he over-estimated the ability of his High Command, notably that of Mahmoud Fawzi, the Chief-of-Staff, and Gen. Munaim Husseini, the commander in Gaza.

The Israelis launched their pre-emptive strike on 5 June 1967, and in six days the Egyptians left 15,000 dead soldiers and almost all of their equipment in the sands of the Sinai; another 12,000 men, including nine generals, were taken

prisoner. The remainder of the army were permitted, as an act of grace, to cross the canal back to Egypt. A great many soldiers took off their boots so that they could run faster—a fact admitted by the Egyptians themselves.

After the disaster the Army tried to re-organise itself but was handicapped by purges—more than 800 senior officers were arrested or dismissed; some were gaoled for life. Nevertheless, by the end of 1967 the scattered formations of the Egyptian Army had been put together again and largely re-equipped with modern Soviet arms and equipment. By the beginning of 1969 the entire command structure of the armed forces was re-organised on Soviet lines, and the combatant element of the Army grouped into three armies—the Soviet 'army' was roughly the equivalent of a Western 'corps'. Each army had two infantry and one armoured division.

The Soviet instructors found the Egyptians 'difficult' because by nature they were too impatient to be able to follow Soviet methods, which were methodical, thorough and necessarily slow.

One of the historic breaches hosed in the sand ramparts of the eastern bank of the Suez Canal—the tactical basis for the 'Great Crossing' of October 1973. (Author's collection)



Egyptian Unit Deployment Sinai, June 1967

First defence line:

7th Inf. Div. (incl. approx. 70 T-34 & IS-3 tanks)	Gaza, Rafah, El Arish, Bir Lahfan sector
20th Palestinian Div. (incl. approx. 50 Sherman tanks)	Abu Ageila, Um Katef, Kusseima sector
2nd Inf. Div. (incl. approx. 90 tanks)	

Shazli Force:

Mechanised Task Force (incl. approx. 120 T-54/55 tanks)	Kuntilla area
6th Mechanised Div. (incl. approx. 90 T-54/55 and some IS-3 tanks)	

Second defence line:

3rd Inf. Div. (incl. approx. 90 tanks)	Jebel Libni, Bir Hassana, Jebel Harim sector
4th Armd. Div. (incl. approx. 200 T-54/55 tanks)	Bir Gafgafa, Bir Thamad sector

Nasser, considering the Egyptian officer corps sluggish, asked the Russians to take a larger part in their training. All Egyptian officers were ordered to obey Soviet advisers, even though they might be junior in rank.

The Russians insisted that the Egyptian officers work harder and longer with their men, and many Egyptian officers discovered for the first time that the Egyptian *fellaheen* could be good soldiers if properly led. The Russians also insisted that many officers from wealthy families, accustomed to 'upper class' privileges, be replaced with younger men who understood Soviet ideals.

The Egyptian commandos were tough and well trained, and their operations worried the Israelis more than they have ever admitted. During the War of Attrition—1968–70—the Israelis raided across the canal, but the traffic was not all one-way. Egyptian commandos repeatedly crossed, laid small ambushes, killed perhaps two Israelis in a jeep, and then returned to base. An ambitious raid was the 'Mitla Pass Operation', though it was smaller than this title suggests. Under cover of a barrage the commando team penetrated some distance along the road to Mitla, ambushed two Israeli jeeps and wounded one soldier. During the latter part of 1969 the commandos raided practically every night.

Another major commando raid occurred on 10

July 1969, when the Egyptians penetrated Israeli positions opposite Port Tewfik, causing 40 casualties for no loss. Commando activity became increasingly intense, and on 19 May 1970 a raiding party of 90 attacked an Israeli unit, in daylight, near Shalloufa in the southern sector. On 30 May commandos ambushed a truck convoy seven miles south of Port Fuad, killing 17 Israelis and destroying the convoy.

The Egyptian Army was eventually outfought in the War of Attrition; but it was an important conflict, for it provided the opportunity to train a large number of soldiers for an invasion at some future point.

The Great Crossing

Tom ye—the day of attack—came on 6 October 1973—the day of The Great Crossing, as the Egyptians call it. Seen from the Egyptian side, the fascination of the October conflict to the student of war is not the war itself—the Arab armies lost that—but the way in which the Suez crossing was achieved.

The Egyptian Army commanders had more martial guile than the Israelis gave them credit



Ecstatic Egyptian soldiers raise their own flag over a captured Israeli strongpoint in the 'Bar-Lev Line', and hurl the Israeli flag away. The Egyptian victory cost many casualties, but was of enormous psychological value. (Author's collection)

for. Their deceptive manoeuvres before the October War had a long history, beginning with the sand walls which the Egyptians built up on the west bank of the Suez Canal. The Israelis interpreted these earthworks as 'occupational therapy' for the Egyptians, bored with sitting by the Canal. They saw no significance in the fact that these walls were always a fraction higher than those built by the Israelis themselves on the east bank. Nobody expected an attack in the Muslim month of fasting, Ramadan. As part of the deception the Cairo papers reported that officers were to be given leave for the *Omrah*—the 'little pilgrimage' of Ramadan. In the weeks before the invasion troops in brigade strength openly moved out to the Canal on manoeuvres—but in the evening only a battalion returned. The bridges and pontoons for the crossing were moved at night. Soldiers at the Canal were not allowed to wear steel helmets until the moment of attack.

But long before this the Engineer Corps, commanded by Gen. Gamal Muhammad Ali, had artificially created Suez Canal conditions in the Nile Delta. Sappers practised the Canal crossing there 300 times from 1968 onwards, using full-scale reproductions of the Israelis' 'Bar-Lev Line'. The idea of using water-cannon to break through the sand ramparts was not so revolutionary: during the building of the Aswan High Dam they were used to bore holes to take explosives.

The standard pontoon bridge of the time could be assembled at the rate of four feet a minute—two hours for the width of the Canal. With the latest Russian bridge a rate of 15 feet a minute was possible. Artillery officers spent a long time experimenting to find the best way of clearing a path two metres wide through the Israeli mine-fields; they decided to use 50mm mortars. During five years of exercises the artillery used 87 times the normal annual scale of live ammunition; each gun crew, the Egyptians say, fired 6,000 rounds in practice.

The Egyptian Armed Forces, according to one of their manuals, 'view training as a battle more

ferocious than the actual fighting'. There is some truth in this; in one war game in upper Egypt in preparation for the Canal crossing, more than 300 soldiers were killed.

On 6 October 1973 at 1405 hrs, the artillery commander of the Egyptian Second Army, Brig. Abu Ghasala, in his command post near Ismailia, gave the order, 'Fire'. According to Egyptian figures, 2,000 guns fired 100,500 shells in the first 53 minutes—to destroy the Bar-Lev strongpoints, artillery batteries, command posts, reserve concentration areas and warning stations. During the whole operation, say the Egyptians, they fired about one million shells and rockets. The Egyptian Engineer Corps opened 77 gaps and paths through the sand rampart, moving 640,000 tons of sand. Then they built ten heavy bridges and operated a large number of ferries.

The first assault wave flung rope and bamboo ladders against the ramparts and scrambled up. An observer would have noticed that the soldiers were carrying unusually-shaped equipment. Some had tubes over their shoulders, others canvas-covered cases in their hands or strapped to their backs. The tubes were launchers of an advanced Russian-built 'bazooka'—the Rocket Propelled Grenade, RPG-7. The case contained a much more sophisticated device—a Russian wire-guided anti-tank missile codenamed 'Sagger'. These soldiers did not try to capture the Bar-Lev bunkers: that was the task of the second wave. The first wave was to destroy the Israeli tanks and artillery behind the line.

In small 'buggies' ferried across, the missile troops fanned into the desert for ten miles. Here they dug in and brought into action the third of their new infantry weapons, the portable Russian anti-aircraft missile, SAM 7. Their orders were now to hold their ground against counter-attacks by tanks and aircraft for 24 hours.

The assault across the Suez Canal was one of the most impressive water crossings in military history. It followed Soviet methods, taking place according to a strict timetable. Within ten hours Egypt moved nearly five complete infantry divisions into Sinai, then quickly reinforced them with 800 tanks and a remarkable array of anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons.

Following the Canal crossing the Egyptians

Egyptian Forces October 1973

2nd Army

2nd Inf.Div.—two inf.bdes., one mech.bde., one tank bde.

16th Inf.Div.

18th Inf. Div.

21st Armd.Div.—two tank bdes., one mech. bde.

23rd Mech.Div.—two mech.bdes., one tank bde.

3rd Army

7th Inf.Div.

19th Inf. Div.

4th Armd.Div.

6th Mech.Div.

GHQ Reserve

3rd Mech.Div.

Independent Tk.Bde.

Two Paratroop Bdes.

Marine Bdes. (incl. 130th)

28 Commando Bns.

established two bridgeheads. The Israelis failed in a counter-attack on 8 October, and the Egyptians then had time to rest and regroup—and this was their downfall. For more than 25 years the Egyptians had failed to make a dent in the Israeli defences. Now that they had made a great hole they did not know how to handle their advantage. Soviet doctrine, in which the Egyptians were steeped, called for Egyptian armour to drive rapidly east and take the real objectives, the vital passes. Instead, they tried to improve on the bridgehead by small local actions, ready for the next thrust.

The Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief, Gen. Ismail, was ultra-cautious and wanted to move step by step. His Chief-of-Staff—Maj. Gen. Saad Shazli, the Arik Sharon of Egypt and an adventurous, ambitious and dynamic paratrooper—wanted an all-out attack. His plan was for a two-pronged attack plus an amphibious landing behind the Israeli lines on the Mediterranean coast.

Egyptian chances waned as one indecisive day followed another. President Sadat decided to make a limited attack as planned by Ismail, and on 13 October Egyptian armour moved into the

already packed bridgeheads. As earlier, the movement was well organised—far better so than foreign observers could believe. Convoys converged from several directions and yet were never congested, as military policemen with coloured lights directed them to their crossing bridges and then to assembly areas.

The Israelis smashed the second offensive, then crossed the Canal into Egypt and encircled the Third Army; and once again super-power intervention in the UN saved the Egyptians from disaster. The October War is important because of the changed perceptions, within Egypt, of the Egyptian soldier. The greatest surprise, the

Egyptian military historians say, was not so much the attack itself as the 'creation of the new Arab fighter'. This is a description of the 'new fighter' from an Egyptian book, *On the Fourth Arab-Israeli Round*:

'He is a courageous giant, who is honest in fighting, who does not molest the wounded or prisoners of war; who is courageous and daring and self-confident, with confidence in his weapon, in his commanders . . . The strong combatant whose ancestors carved the granite and made marvellous statues out of it. The obstinate, stubborn combatant . . . who looks forward to the attaining of martyrdom in battle with unparalleled bravery and incredible self-sacrifice. The whole world recognised the skilfulness of the Egyptian soldier and admitted that he had changed the theories of the art of war. It was a magnificent performance to see the heroism of the infantry while opening gaps in the enemy mine-fields with their bodies, which were torn to pieces

Three of the five-man Egyptian crew of a Soviet 82mm mortar wearing the special load-carrying assault jerkin which was issued to most of the first wave across the Canal in 1973, and which was something of a 'secret weapon' at that time. It is illustrated and discussed in detail under Plate B. The total weight of an infantryman's kit is 30kg—around 60lb—without his weapon, but the weight is well distributed by this jerkin. (Author's collection)





by the explosions. This neither scared nor stopped the following wave . . . the Egyptian soldier continued advancing until gaps were opened in the defences . . . Great soldiers offer their lives cheap for Egypt.'

The Army credits its Commandos and Air Cavalry of the Egyptian Special Troops with great heroism and effectiveness. Landed by helicopters in the depths of the Sinai they attacked Israeli reserves, and in delaying them inflicted heavy losses. Brig. Nabil Shukri, who founded and led the Commandos, claims that his men killed more than 1,000 Israelis and destroyed 200 tanks and armoured vehicles. The most successful soldier of the anti-tank troops was Sgt. Ibrahim Abdel Monein el Masri, who is credited with having blown up 26 tanks; he was awarded the highest Egyptian award for bravery, the Star of Sinai.

The October War certainly showed that Egyptian soldiers can be determined and successful fighters, and that the Army is capable of sophisticated military planning. It still has a long way to go, however, in the development of a good officer corps and an NCO force of initiative.

Egyptians crew a 7.62mm Soviet Goryunov machine gun, licence-built in Egypt, in an emplacement overlooking one of the passes in the southern Sinai recaptured in 1973. (Author's collection)

Syrians on the Heights

In October 1973 a British diplomat in Amman, the Jordanian capital, studied a report about the Syrian Army's successes in the first days of the Yom Kippur War. 'Good starters, the Syrians,' he said, 'but bad finishers.' And in Israel the *Jerusalem Post* quoted an Israeli officer on the Golan Heights as saying, 'In the last analysis the Syrians are chicken.'

Many Israelis deride the Syrians as soldiers, though with little cause; they were much more determined than the Egyptians, and from 1948 until the present they have been Israel's most persistent and ferocious enemies. The Syrian Army as an *organisation*, before the 1970s, could not be taken seriously because the command structure was seriously damaged from within by political differences. During the 1967 war most officers had come from the Alawite Muslim sect, and under



Parade of Soviet T-62 tanks, used in some numbers by both Egypt and Syria in the 1973 war. The main armament is the 115mm U5-T smoothbore gun firing fin-stabilised projectiles. These had awesome penetrating power when a hit was obtained; on the Golan Heights they were less effective over ranges of 1,500m, since the gusting highland wind cut down their accuracy. Israeli tankmen found that even a glancing hit from a more conventional APDS shell was enough to detonate the ammunition stored inside the turret of the thickly-armoured T-62. (Author's collection)

heavy fire they deserted their men, who were mainly of the Shi'ite sect and therefore 'inferior'. Where officers and men stuck together they fought well, as in the battle of Tel Faq'r in 1967.

That officers often did not lead, in the accepted Western sense, was because of the custom—noted until the 1970s—for officers to stay at least 50 yards behind their men in an attack. According to Syrian military thinking the officers could thus better control their men—and more easily shoot those who deserted under fire. In any case, officers were more valuable than men. Junior officers were used to operating on the basis of written orders rather than on their own responsibility. In combat they have so far lacked the personal initiative and mental flexibility required in a fast-moving mechanised war. All too often in 1967 it was the officers who fled first, leaving the soldiers to extricate themselves as best they could. Israeli soldiers over-running Syrian gun emplacements found, in at least two cases, the crew chained to their guns.

It would be truer to say of the Syrian Army that its soldiers have won battles, sometimes in spite of their officers, but that its generals have lost wars.

The Syrian Army was indirectly founded by the French in 1919 when they raised the 8,000-strong Syrian Legion, reinforced by an armed gendarmerie. In 1939 the French commander in Syria, Gen. Weygand, doubled the strength of the Syrian Legion—though it contained as many Circassians, Armenians and Druse as Arabs. At

the end of the 1939–45 war, with Syria in British hands, a British military mission restructured the Syrian forces and sent Syrian officers to Egypt for training in British establishments. When Syria became independent in 1946 the Army still numbered 8,000 men, many of whom took part in the invasion of Israel in 1948.

The armoured units were equipped with left-behind French material. The Syrians had one battalion of 45 R-35 and R-39 light tanks, used by the Vichy French Forces in their campaign against Australian and British units in 1941. They also had some left-overs from the Free French units which had succeeded the Vichy troops: these included Bren carriers and Marmon-Herrington armoured cars. During the 1948 war the tank battalion was broken up into units of eight to twelve vehicles, one being allotted to each infantry brigade. There was also a small number of self-propelled guns built on improvised chassis, such as 65mm mountain guns on a Chenillette Lorraine 38L, and even 25mm anti-tank guns on Bren carriers.

In 1948 the Syrians were a more serious threat to the Israelis than the Egyptians. The invading Syrian column, accompanied by armour, concentrated south of the Sea of Galilee and moved to break through to Nazareth and Tiberias. First they took the Israeli-held Arab town of Semach, inflicting heavy losses on the Israelis. Rallied by Ben Gurion and Yigal Yadin, the Chief-of-Staff, the settlers blocked the next Syrian assault with a Molotov cocktail inferno and two 19th-century 65mm guns. Further north, though, Syrian units were more persistent, and after bitter fighting captured Mishmar Hayarden.


The humiliation of the 1948–49 Arab defeat led to a military coup in March 1949; Col. Husni az Zaim overthrew the government of Shukri al Kuwatli and became dictator until August, when he himself was overthrown and executed: thereafter coup followed coup. Such political instability, with frequent changes of military command, did nothing for the Army's efficiency.

France was Syria's main military source throughout the 1950s, supplying an interesting mixture of equipment including reconditioned German vehicles such as PzKpfw IV Ausf.Hs, StuG IIIs and a few Panzerjäger IVs. In the early

1960s the Soviets replaced France and the equipment became more formidable, including T-34/85s. Syria used these tanks in the 'Water War' against Israel, which began in November 1964. The Syrians started this war by diverting the Jordan and Yarmouk rivers, thus disrupting Israeli agriculture. Israeli guns and planes hit the Syrian engineering works and the Syrians, in turn, attacked Israeli farms with tanks. The Israelis sent in their major tank unit, 7th Armoured Brigade, and their 105mm Centurions frightened off the Syrians.

This reverse brought the Syrians better equipment from the USSR, including T-54s. The Syrian 14th and 44th Armoured Brigades were supplied with T-54s, T-55s and some T-34/85s. Eight tank battalions were formed, with T-34s and old Panthers, to be attached to infantry brigades in wartime. SU-100 self-propelled guns were attached to anti-tank companies in the armoured and mechanised brigades, and the newly formed 17th Mechanised Brigade was given BTR-152 APCs.

Passing in parade before Egypt's monument to the 'Unknown Soldier', built after the 1973 war, Soviet-supplied BTR-50 amphibious APCs. These carry 15 infantry: three battalions with a mixed equipment of PT-76 amphibious tanks and BTR-50s—the 130th Marine Bde.—were among the first units across the Canal, but their light armour proved too vulnerable when they attempted an immediate assault on the Mitla and Jidi Passes. (Author's collection)



Egyptian parades have featured some light vehicles which lead one to suspect that crowd-pleasing has played a greater part than tactical realism. This jeep mounting for four Malyutka ('Sagger') wire-guided ATGMs is a case in point. The 'Sagger' was certainly effective when operated by daring two-man infantry teams. Whether this high and visible vehicle could live long enough in the thick of an armoured battle for the three-man crew to fire their missiles and guide them to the target seems highly unlikely. (Author's collection)

By 1967 the Syrian Army had about 750 tanks and 585 APCs. A distinctive dark green in colour, the tanks frequently had names painted on turret sides in white Arabic script, often referring to heroes of past wars, including the 1948 campaign. A thick white ring was painted on turret roofs for air identification.

Between 1948 and 1967 the Syrians established their great 'Maginot Line' along the border with Israel. Underground bunkers, tank-pits and gun emplacements covered the ridge that runs northwards from the Sea of Galilee and dominates the low-lying plains of Israel to the west. This fortified belt was infinitely stronger than any other of the Arab-Israeli wars. The Syrian border ran along the edge of the Golan Heights, 2,000 feet above Israeli territory. The steep, bare slopes, a superb natural glacis, joined at the other end the Sea of Galilee, which protected the Syrian left flank. In all the defences were more than ten miles deep, row upon row of emplacements and guns. They could fire ten tons of shells a minute from the 265 guns in the first line, apart from the Russian-made vehicle-launched Katyusha missiles.

In June 1967 the fighting between Israel and Syria lasted less than 30 hours and was confined to a narrow sector only 50 kilometres long. The

decisive stage of the Israeli offensive was concentrated on a still narrower front, and saw only two brigades fully committed for a single day. Yet the Syrian campaign of 1967 is one of the most interesting episodes in modern military history, because it provided a much more valid test of Russian tactics in action than the Egyptian campaign. In Sinai the Soviet 'sword and shield' doctrine—the shield blocks the enemy offensive while the sword strikes—was improperly applied because Egyptian forces were too thinly spread over a vast area: the shields were overstretched, and their flanks were uncovered. In Syria the front to be defended was shorter and the flanks were fully secured.

The Syrians assembled an assault force consisting of several infantry brigades, an armoured and a mechanised brigade and a special commando force opposite the Israeli bastion at Mishmar Hayarden. Additional armoured units took up positions on the road from Kuneitra to the assembly point of the assault force. Deeper in the

T-55 tanks, their 100mm main guns fitted with British-made Xenon infra-red projectors. Egypt used large numbers of the T-54/55 series in both 1967 and 1973, and apparently finds them satisfactory. Desert fighting requires quick and accurate ranging, however, and in this respect the T-54/55 was at a disadvantage compared with the more sophisticated equipment fitted to tanks of Western design—a disadvantage which could make the difference of half a mile's range in battle. Russian tanks also tend to overheat in the desert, and tropical conditions aggravate the already severe problem of crew discomfort and fatigue. (Author's collection)

rear two infantry brigades were placed south and north of Kuneitra. Three more brigades manned the fortified positions along the frontier. In all the Syrians had 65,000 men, 350 tanks, 300 artillery pieces and 200 anti-aircraft guns on the frontier.

With four reinforced infantry brigades in the first line, the shield was thick enough to conform to the Russian doctrine. Should the Israelis get through the 'shield' of fortifications, they faced the main Syrian 'sword'—three brigades, infantry/armour/mechanised—ready to counter-attack.

By 8 June, with Egypt and Jordan knocked out of the war, the Syrians were maintaining a constant shelling of Israel. Israel, for political as well as military reasons, did not attack. The Syrian High Command was hoping to cause as much damage as possible before the UN imposed a cease-fire. But early on 9 June the Israeli offensive began. The Syrians held grimly to their positions of Tel Azaziyat, Tel Faq'r and Bourj Bravil. The battle of Tel Faq'r showed the Syrian soldier at his best: here the officers stood firm, rallied their men and really led. They cut down the first wave of attacking Israeli infantry and only a few men of the second wave got through the barbed wire and the minefield. The third wave reached the trenches, where the Syrians met them with rifle butts, knives, fists and teeth; only after a three-hour fight did the Syrians succumb.

In other sectors a panic flight towards Damascus





developed: This was not the result of cowardice, as has been suggested; it was the backfire of inept propaganda. The Syrian Government wanted to induce the super-powers to impose an immediate cease-fire, so it announced that Kuneitra—the 'capital' of the Golan—had fallen to the Israelis. In fact the Israelis were several hours away from capture, but the Syrian soldiers, hearing the broadcast, knew that with Kuneitra gone their line of retreat was cut. Improperly led, the troops headed for home.

The Syrians' gunnery was particularly poor and the Russian instructors were angry and critical; several times during the fighting they sent radio messages saying 'Stop firing on the enemy settlements—shoot at the troops.' The Syrian Army lost 1,000 men killed, 600 captured and many thousands wounded in their attempt to hold the Golan Heights. But the Israelis lost more tanks—160 of them—on the Golan Heights in two days of fighting than in either of the other two main theatres. The Syrians lost about 80.

With much Soviet help the Syrian Army was reconstructed, re-armed and retrained. Thirsting

T-62 crew of Egyptian 3rd Army photographed during the disengagement of February 1974. Pale khaki drill and olive drab field uniforms are both visible; the helmets are the black canvas Russian type; and note the pull-over hooded anoraks, which are light brown drab in colour. (United Nations/Y. Nagata, courtesy S. Zaloga)

for revenge, the generals fought several battles of attrition against the Israelis, and constantly sent shells and rockets crashing into the settlements of the Huleh Valley. After the Air Force Commander, Hafiz al Assad, seized power in the tenth coup since 1948 the intensity of Syrian aggression increased. Syria also became the main departure point for Palestine Liberation Organisation terrorist raids into Israel after PLO arrogance led to their costly expulsion from Jordan.

By 1973, with top-level secret planning for the October War in progress, the Syrian Army presented a completely different picture from that which had been so soundly beaten in the Six-Day War, largely because of the work of thousands of Russian instructors. They taught the Syrian soldiers how to operate the several hundred T-62 tanks, BMP-1 APCs, and quantities of 'Sagger' ATGWs. The combat organisation was strictly

according to Soviet pattern. In position along the cease-fire line were three infantry divisions, staggered in depth to a three-line defence system. Each of these divisions had two infantry brigades with their own tank battalions, and a mechanised brigade of APCs reinforced by an attached tank brigade. In each of the three divisions were 230 tanks—700 in the first echelon. Behind the first line was an even more powerful force—3rd Armoured Division—and south of this was the 1st Armoured Division. These powerful units were held ready to exploit any local success with a massive breakthrough. The Assad Republican Guard—a brigade equipped with T-62s—and two other independent tank brigades made up the third line: the Army had a total of 1,500 tanks.

In conformity with Soviet doctrine, the Syrians planned to take the Golan Heights with a three-echelon attack; the first and second assaults would be made by the three reinforced infantry divisions, the third by two division-size 'exploitation forces'. The assault timetable demanded that the Jordan River bridges at Benot Yaakov and Arik be taken within 24 hours.

The Army commander in 1973 was Gen. Moustafa Tlas, probably the most able Syrian general in 30 years. He had joined the Army in

Syrian and Allied Forces Golan Heights, October 1973	
7th Inf.Div.	—two inf.bdes., one mech.bde., one tank bde. (68th?)
9th Inf.Div.	—two inf.bdes., one mech.bde., 47th Tank Bde.
5th Inf.Div.	—two inf.bdes., 132nd Mech.Bde., 46th Tank Bde.
1st Armd.Div.	—40th Mech.Bde., two tank bdes. of which one was 51st
3rd Armd.Div.	—15th Mech.Bde., two tank bdes. Assad Republican Guard Bde. (tank bde., T-62s)
78th, 81st, 91st	Independent Tank Bdes.
Iraqi 3rd Armd.Div.	—6th & 12th Tank Bdes., 8th Mech.Bde.
Jordanian 3rd Armd.Div.	—see separate table
Moroccan Mech.Bde.	
PLA	—two Commando Bdes.
Kuwaiti Inf.Bn.Grp.	
Saudi Arabian 20th Mech.Regt.	

1964 and had seen no action in 1967, but was promoted to Chief-of-Staff in 1968. His own Chief-of-Staff in 1973 was Yusif Shakkour. Neither enjoyed the popular 'do-and-dare' image common among Israeli generals, and the Israeli Command under-estimated them.

Tlas and Shakkour planned an aggressive air attack, and a carpet of artillery fire to precede the armour-infantry assault. Using hundreds of tracks and roads, the Syrians would reach the edge of the plateau overlooking the Sea of Galilee before the Israelis could bring up their reserve armour. The Syrians would return to their pre-1967 positions, encircle the Sea of Galilee, capture Tiberias on the western shore, and cut off the whole of northern Israel.

The Golan presented great difficulties for the Israelis, but it also gave the Syrians a major problem and, in the end, a fatal one. To succeed on the Golan the Syrians had to fight a war of continuing movement and unceasing assault. But this was the warfare at which the Israeli tankers excelled—as Syria learned to its terrible cost.

The Syrian offensive, co-ordinated with their allies, came in with the advantage of surprise, and with an explosive drive that shook the Israelis. The Golan plateau seemed massed with tanks in the Syrian camouflage of olive green and sand yellow. But the Syrians had not made adequate plans for crossing the anti-tank ditch which the Israelis had dug for the entire length of the dividing 'Purple Line'. They brought up many MTU tracked bridge-layers to span the anti-tank ditch, but these lumbering monsters were primary targets for the Israeli gunners; few survived to lay their bridges, and the attack was delayed. Nevertheless, the outnumbered Israeli 188 Armoured Brigade were eventually unable to hold their line, and the Syrians pushed on to within a ten-minute drive from the cliff overlooking the Sea of Galilee. They were ten minutes too late. The Israeli reserve armour, grinding up from the valleys, stopped the Syrians dead.

Syrian heli-borne paratroopers achieved a great success on the first day when they captured the Israeli outpost on the crest of Mount Hermon. They held it against the first counter-attack, killing 30 Israelis, including the commander, with sniper and mortar fire. They lost their positions—



and the mountains—when the Israeli 1st Infantry ('Golani') Brigade attacked by night. The Syrians are not natural night-fighters, and are given little training in this most difficult form of warfare.

On the northern part of the Golan the Syrians, despite great losses, fought fiercely to achieve a breakthrough. Reinforcements were pushed in, together with a heli-borne commando battalion with 'Sagger' missiles, in an effort to take the blocking Israeli tanks from the rear. One helicopter was destroyed by a tank shell, and the other commandos were rounded up.

In this intense battle of destruction in 'the Valley of Tears' 260 tanks of the Syrian 7th Division and Assad Republican Guard, together with well over 200 bridge-layers, BMPs and BRDMs, were knocked out. The Israeli 7th Armoured Brigade had only seven runners left of their original strength of 105. The battle ended with shocked and confused Syrian soldiers frantically seeking

Syrian troops in Damascus during a period of tension between Syria and Egypt in 1961. They were poorly armed and equipped at the time; many units were without steel helmets. Note FN rifles. In 1967 many Syrian troops seem to have worn a basically similar outfit of khaki drill uniforms and shemagh headdress. (Author's collection)

shelter from the Israeli guns among their wrecked armour.

The battle raged on—eastwards towards the Syrian capital—but the war was decided when the Israeli armoured reserves arrived. The Syrian command, sure of victory, had no real plans for their reserves in the case of a withdrawal. The Syrian Government did not publish casualty figures after the October War, but it is certain that some 7,000 troops were killed, that entire formations were destroyed, and that 600 tanks were lost.



A Syrian tank commander photographed during the 1961 crisis, when the 'union' with Egypt broke down and Egyptian troops stationed in Syria attempted to take over the country, leading to several inconclusive skirmishes. The tank is the Russian T-34/85, fitted here with the heavy DShK anti-aircraft machine gun. The commander wears khaki battledress of British appearance, and the black canvas Soviet helmet. (Author's collection)

There were also seven second-line Independent Companies.

The Legion artillery had had virtually no experience. Otherwise the Legion, though small, was professionally formidable and King Abdullah of Jordan expected it to be able to defeat any opposition in the Middle East. On the day on which Israel was to become a state, 15 May, he proposed to occupy those parts of Palestine on Jordan's frontiers; the military operations were to be directed by Lt.Gen. John Glubb (Glubb Pasha) and the field command was to be in the hands of Brig. Norman Lash.

On 15 May the Arab Legion crossed into Israel, the 1st Bde. (1st and 3rd Regts.) going to Nablus and the 3rd Bde. (2nd and 4th Regts.) to Ramallah. Glubb was reluctant to move into Jerusalem, which was supposedly international, but he sent his 4th Regt. to Latrun to block Jewish reinforcements being sent to Jerusalem from Tel Aviv. On 17 May King Abdullah ordered Glubb into Jerusalem and he sent the 1st Independent Company to man the Old City walls. These troops were too few to resist the Israeli attacks, and on 19 May a 'scratch' force of infantry, armoured cars and artillery totalling some 500 men were committed to the action. Two days later the fight for Jerusalem had become a battle, with the Legion's 3rd Regt. committed. The attempt to take and hold the key area of Notre Dame lasted incessantly for four days; in the end the Legion, exhausted and depleted, withdrew, but the Old City was held.

After this the main action moved to Latrun, where the 4th Regt. and part of the 2nd held out tenaciously against repeated Israeli assaults. Another notable action was the capture and holding of Radar Hill by a company of the 1st Regt. on 26 May. By November 1948 only the Arab Legion and the Iraqi contingent remained in action against the generally victorious Israelis. By the time the Israeli-Transjordan Armistice was signed on 3 April 1949 the Legion held a front of 100

The Hard-Hitting Jordanians

When the Middle East wars began in 1948 the most professional army was the Arab Legion of Transjordan, a colourful formation which often captured the attention of the world's Press. It was particularly well known in Britain because it was trained and led by British officers and it used British equipment. When founded in 1920 it had consisted of five officers, 75 cavalry and 25 mounted machine gunners. By May 1948 the Legion's strength was about 4,500 all ranks and its strike units were four single-battalion lorried infantry regiments—each of which had an armoured car squadron—organised in two brigades, and two four-gun batteries of 25-pounders.



miles with 10,000 men, and when the Iraqis withdrew this front grew to 400 miles.

The enlarged Legion of 12,000 needed senior officers, support services, technical equipment and modern arms—and most of this arrived through the British subsidy of £10,000,000 a year. The Legion rapidly expanded. A full infantry division of nine battalions was formed; the dispersed armoured car squadrons became a regiment, and a second began forming; each infantry brigade of three battalions was given a field artillery regiment; and an anti-tank and a light anti-aircraft regiment were formed. Engineers

Two interesting photos showing President Assad of Syria visiting trenches on the Golan Heights facing Israel. Assad wears general's ranking on his shoulder strap loops; behind him in the larger photo is the Minister of Defence wearing major-general's shoulder boards, and the green general's beret. All personnel here wear the olive drab fatigues, and many of them the casual field cap worn by all ranks in the field—though not in action. The sergeant major (right foreground) wears the Soviet helmet. The second lieutenant on the right in the smaller photo wears a British-style belt; and one officer in the group behind Assad wears a beret with what appears to be an ornate wire-embroidered version of the brass eagle badge worn by other ranks. (Author's collection)



and signallers were trained to support the assault troops.

A battalion, usually well over 800 strong, consisted of battalion HQ, four rifle companies each of three platoons, a support company and a headquarters company. The basic sub-unit was the section of nine men under a corporal. The support company consisted of a mortar platoon, machine gun platoon, anti-tank platoon and pioneer platoon.

Though established and trained on British lines, the Legion had two distinct faces—that of the desert *Bedouin* and of the town *Haderi*. The two were never mixed as they had different temperaments. Generally, the Bedouin were volatile and cheerful men, excellent in attack but not inclined to endure the ‘boredom’ of static defence. The Haderi were more stable, dependable people, not noted for their rashness in the attack.

In various actions against the Israelis after the official end of the 1948–49 war the Legion gained battle experience, and notably held their own in an encounter at Beit Liqya in September 1954. The performance in this action of elements of the new National Guard was particularly encouraging: this was a village defence ‘home guard’ of indifferently armed and trained men under regular Legion NCOs, of which not much had been expected.

With the growing demand for ‘Jordanisation’ of the army, Glubb and the other British officers were dismissed on 1 March 1956, and on that day the Legion became the ‘Jordan Arab Army’. An army unique in Arab military history disappeared as modernisation took over. By 1956 the Army’s strength was 27,000 with a large number of young, trained Jordanian officers; with the departure of the British some quickly became senior officers. They were anxious for war, but during the Suez War of 1956 Jordan, despite its defence treaty with Egypt, kept quiet. Possibly King Hussein realised that his army, in the throes of transition, was in no state for a major war.

Between 1960 and 1967 Jordan added 25,000 men to its armed forces, reaching a total of 55,000; tank strength was up to about 90 Centurions and 300 M47 and M48 Pattons. Even so the Israelis launched their pre-emptive war in June 1967 confident that King Hussein would

remain on the sidelines. Even when Jordanian artillery began shelling Jewish Jerusalem on Monday 5 June the Israelis were not unduly worried. When the Jordanian shelling intensified, not just in Jerusalem but along the entire border, with 155mm ‘Long Toms’ coming into action, and when Jordanian troops occupied the ex-UN Headquarters, the Israelis knew that they had a war on their hands.

The war for the West Bank was conducted by much smaller units than those engaged in the Sinai; the Jordanians and Israelis committed only about a division and a half each. The Jordanians deployed nine brigades on the West Bank—see accompanying Order of Battle. The ‘King Talal’ Bde. was stationed in Jerusalem, the ‘Hashimi’ Bde. was in the hills west of Jerusalem, the ‘Hattin’ Bde. was south of the city and the ‘Imam Ali’ Bde., in reserve, was half way between Jerusalem and Jericho. The main strength on the Jordanian front was to have been the Iraqi forces, but the strong Iraqi columns never reached their destination; repeated air strikes so held them up that by the time they reached the Jordan River the entire West Bank was in Israeli hands.

Inside Jerusalem itself occurred the most dramatic encounter of the 1967 war. Israeli paratroopers and ‘Etzioni’ Bde. infantry fought veteran Jordanian troops of the 4th and 2nd Bns. in a pitched battle for 30 hours. In the fighting for the suburb of Sheikh Jarrah, the Police School and Ammunition Hill the Jordanians resisted bunker by bunker, to the last man. Israeli air-strikes supported the capture of the final Jordanian strongpoint north of the Mount of Olives; and the few encircled survivors in the Walled City were only saved by the UN cease-fire at 2200hrs on 7 June. Harried from the air, the meagre forces available for counter-attack were fought to a standstill around Jenin and Nablus; and the last of the Jordan bridges fell on Thursday morning, 8 June.

Observers were puzzled that the Jordanians could have fought so stoutly for 24 hours, and then crumbled. One reason was King Hussein’s hesitancy and lack of decision. Within 24 hours he three time countermanded orders to retreat from the West Bank after the withdrawal had started. These orders and counter-orders created great confusion;

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1: Egyptian infantry corporal, 1948-49

2: Egyptian infantry captain, 1956

3: Egyptian infantryman, Sinai, 1967



1, 2: Egyptian assault infantry, 1973
3: Egyptian Commando, 1973



1: Sergeant, 4th Regt., Jordan Arab Legion, 1948
2: Lieutenant-colonel, 2nd Regt., Jordan Arab Legion, 1955
3: Corporal, 'King Talal' Bde., Jordan Arab Army, 1967

1: 1st Lt., 1st Mech. Inf. Bn., Jordanian 40th Armd. Bde., late 1970s

2: Lance-corporal, Supply & Transport, Jordanian 4th Mech. Div., late 1970s

3: Brigadier, Jordanian 40th Armd. Bde., 1973



1, 2: Syrian infantry, winter combat dress, 1970s
3: Syrian infantry, summer combat dress, 1970s ?
4: Specialist sergeant, Syrian infantry, 1970s



1, 4: Palestine Liberation Army soldiers, 1970s
2: Palestine Liberation Organisation guerilla, 1970s
3: Palestine Liberation Army recruit, 1970s





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1: Sergeant, Jordanian Special Service Group, 1970s
2: Trooper, Jordanian 2nd Armoured Car Regt., 1955
3: Syrian lieutenant-general, 1970s

4: Staff sergeant, Jordanian Royal Armoured Corps, 1970s
5: Egyptian major-general, 1967

Insignia – see Plates commentaries for details



some units had reached the Jordan River only to be told to return to the posts many miles away. The king's inconsistency was the result of his natural desire both to defend the West Bank, and to save his army for another day.

Another reason for the quick final collapse of the Jordanian Army was its poor deployment. In the days of Glubb, the British conception of a proper defence deployment was to keep the main forces in the hill region with the outlying villages in the frontier area only sparsely defended. Glubb argued that the Israelis could be blocked from gaining a foothold in the hills of Judea and Samaria, while reinforcements would always be ready to send to any of the frontier villages. This Jordanian defence concept was scrapped in 1962. For psychological and political reasons it was felt

necessary to defend every inch of Jordanian soil; the main strength was thus committed in the first line of defence, with very few units available to counter an enemy breakthrough into the rear areas. After the disbandment of the National Guard, for political reasons, in 1965, the Jordanian High Command had decided to form five new Jordanian brigades, but they had not been built in June 1967. The Army was spread so thinly that one battalion, the 20th ('Ziad bin Tarik') was spread out in platoons and sections along more than ten miles of the border.

Another reason for the collapse of the Jordanian front may have lain in the somewhat changed character of the Jordanian Army. Under Glubb and British command the soldiers, semi-literate Bedouin on long-term contracts, were tough,

Jordan Arab Army Dispositions, 1 June 1967

Western Command

Nablus Sector:

Khalid bin al Walid Bde., Jenin-Nablus
19th (Musa bin Nusareh)Bn., 20th (Ziad bin Tarik)Bn., 21st (Oukba bin Nafea)Bn.;
12th Armoured Regt. in support (M47 Pattons)
Aliya Bde., Tulkarm-Qalqiliya-Nablus
5th (King Ali)Bn., 7th (King Abdullah)Bn., 14th (King Mohammad V)Bn.
Qadisiya Bde., Damiya
41st (Omar Ibn Al Khattab)Bn., 43rd (Saad Ibn Abhi Waqas)Bn.,
45th (Hamzah bin Abdul Muttalib)Bn.
40th Armoured Bde., Damiya
2nd Armoured Regt., 4th Armoured Regt., 1st Mechanised Bn. (M48 Pattons, M113 APCs)

Jerusalem-Hebron Sectors:

Talal Bde., Jerusalem
2nd (King Hussein)Bn., 4th (Prince Hassan)Bn., 8th (Imam Ali Osama)Bn.
Hashimi Bde., Qalqiliya-Latrun-Ramallah
6th (King Ghazi)Bn., 9th (Prince Mohammad)Bn., 10th (Hashimi)Bn.
Hattin Bde., Hebron
37th (Abdullah bin Roahaa)Bn., 39th (Jafar bin Abu Talib)Bn.,
49th (Salahudin Ayyubi)Bn.; 10th Armoured Regt. in support (Centurions)
Imam Ali Bde., Ain Qilt-Jericho
31st (Abdul Rehman Ghaffiky)Bn., 33rd (Zeid bin Haritha)Bn.,
35th (Osama bin Zeid)Bn.
60th Armoured Bde., Ain Qilt-Jericho
3rd Armoured Regt., 5th Armoured Regt., 3rd Royal Guards Mechanised Bn. (M48 Pattons, M113 APCs)

Eastern Command

Yarmuk Bde., Jordan Valley, Beisan-Irbid
24th (Abu Obeida)Bn., 26th (Shurabeel bin Hasna)Bn., 28th (Amer bin Al Aas)Bn.
Hussein bin Ali Bde., Aqaba
3rd (Princess Basma)Bn., 15th (Khalid bin el Walid)Bn., 16th (King Feisal)Bn.



President Assad invests an officer of the Syrian Armoured Corps with a decoration. He wears the khaki cloth battledress uniform worn as service dress in winter—the reproduction of the photo has made it seem darker than its true tone. The beret is light grey, as are the shoulder boards, and the Corps badge is worn on the collar. An interesting death's-head badge is pinned to the pocket, and this is believed to indicate participation in some 'forlorn hope' type of action. (Author's collection)

independent, well versed in fieldcraft and desert warfare. With 'Jordanisation' and mechanisation the army had to exchange the camel for the tank. The Bedouin, naturally enough in a way, tended to be passed over for promotion, in favour of better educated groups considered to be more suitable for the needs of the modern army—but who lacked the special qualities which had made the Bedouin such a fine soldier.

There were other moments of glory for the Jordanians, however, apart from the 'Talal' Brigade's epic defence of Jerusalem. At Jenin in the northern hills the 'Khalid bin al Walid' Infantry Brigade conducted a skilled and determined defence against attacks by Col. Bar Kochva's

armoured brigade of the Israeli 'Ugda Peled' (divisional force of mixed tanks and mechanised infantry) on 5 June. The fighting went on throughout the night of 5/6 June, and Israeli casualties were significant. At one point the attackers exposed their right flank to a counter-attack by two companies of the understrength Jordanian 12th Armd. Regt.; in a brisk action some 17 or 18 Super-Shermans were knocked out by the scarcely less venerable M47s, and sporadic tank fighting continued during the night, in the course of which the Jordanian unit was reduced to four 'runners'. At first light the survivors were reinforced by some 50 M48 Pattons of the 40th Armd. Bde., in what the Israelis admit was 'the most effective counter-attack launched by an Arab army during the war', which inflicted heavy loss on the Israeli rear and flank.

The 40th and 60th Armd. Bdes., both with M48s, had been Jordan's only important reserve units, posted initially at Damiya in the north and Jericho in the south. On 5 June in response to a totally false claim that an Egyptian armoured thrust was nearing Hebron, the 60th Armd. Bde. was ordered in the direction of that city to link with their allies. To cover the rear of the Jerusalem sector, Col. Rakan Jazy's 40th Armd. Bde. was ordered 25 miles south to replace the 60th—a journey made by day, under skies ruled by Israeli jets. The formation completed the journey, only to receive new orders to return to Damiya. Both Jordan's armoured reserve formations thus spent the whole of the 5th wandering pointlessly around the rear areas and suffering heavy air attacks.

Nevertheless, the 40th sent strong units into the attack on the Kabatiya junction south of Jenin at first light on the 6th. In the words of an Israeli account: 'In a deliberate shoot-and-move attack, Jordanian Pattons shot up the scattered Israeli mechanised forces which had been left behind at the junction when [Bar Kochva's] brigade looped round to attack Jenin. At this point the bulk of [the] brigade was still embattled in Jenin town. When the Israelis started to pull out their tanks to counter-attack at the junction, the Jordanian troops in Jenin began to fight with renewed intensity, holding up the extrication of Col. Moshe's [Bar Kochva's] tanks. The divisional



artillery stemmed the Jordanian assault at the junction ... but could not rescue the forces trapped in the area. When [Bar Kochva's] tanks finally reached the scene, the Jordanians attacked them in turn, and the Israelis came near to defeat ... It was the Israeli Air Force that saved the day for the Israelis: its airstrikes stopped the Jordanians and forced them to withdraw.' In fact the 40th Armd.Bde. was subjected to a series of devastating air strikes throughout the 6th, while it fought its way back to the Jenin-Nablus road under attack by Centurions of Col. Uri Ram's brigade. By midday on 7 June the 2nd and 4th Armd.Regts. and 1st Mechanised Regt. had virtually ceased to exist; only eight Pattons managed to withdraw across the Jordan. The 60th Armd.Bde. was also wiped out, fighting the 'Harel' Bde. under constant air attack in the Ramallah-Jerusalem sector.

The destruction of a large part of the Jordan Arab Army in 1967, together with the loss of the most prosperous half of the country, forced Jordan to keep a low profile in the years that followed. The Palestinian 'commando' organisations based in Jordan presented a real danger

Syrian infantry on the march, wearing khaki drill shirtsleeve uniform of several varying tones, and green berets. Their drill leaves much to be desired; but when well led they are formidable fighting troops. (Author's collection)

to the integrity of King Hussein's government, as they both attracted Israeli retaliation, and directly flouted the government's authority. It was in resisting a major Israeli reprisal, however, that the Jordanian Army won a local but psychologically important victory at Karama on 21 March 1968. Jordanian and Israeli accounts vary wildly in the numbers involved and the casualties inflicted. Basically, a helicopter-borne Israeli paratroop force landed at the El Fatah camp at Karama and severely mauled the Palestinians, while armoured units—reportedly of the 7th Armd.Bde. and 80th Mech.Bde.—advanced across the Jordan to link up with the paratroopers, covering their withdrawal. The Jordanian artillery, elements of the 'Hattin' and 'Aliya' Bdes. of the newly-formed 1st Inf.Div., and tanks of the 60th Armd.Bde. engaged the Israelis and seriously harassed their withdrawal, inflicting casualties in men and tanks. Whatever the true figures, the Jordanian perform-



Syrian officer cadets take an oath of allegiance to president and nation at their passing-out parade at Damascus; these young men are as carefully chosen for political reliability as for leadership potential. The uniform is a four-pocket tunic and slacks in light khaki drill with gilt buttons, adorned with blue epaulettes with gold crescents and yellow fringes. The peaked shako is of white fleece with blue feathers, a blue panel with gold stars and trim, and gold false chin cords. Note in foreground the size and placing of the type of round shoulder patch illustrated on Plate H. (Author's collection)

ance impressed the Israelis and heartened the Jordanians.

In 1970-71 virtually the whole of the Army, now painfully rebuilt with the aid of Western supplies, was engaged in the final reckoning with the overconfident Palestinian 'commandos'. The task was undertaken with relish; the traditional loyalty of the Army to the Hashemite royal house is as much religious as political in character, and the Army had been infuriated by a long series of slights to Hussein's authority on the part of the Palestinians. When strong Syrian armoured forces crossed into northern Jordan on 21 September 1970 to support the PLO, the Jordanian 40th and 60th Armd. Bdes. repulsed the invasion with heavy loss.

In the 1973 war King Hussein waited until the second week to intervene militarily, and then only with great caution. The 186-mile Jordan-Israel front was so quiet that both sides allowed civilian traffic across the Jordan River to continue. The king moved two brigades to Syria, where they held part of the line in the southern sector, but their involvement in the Golan fighting was obviously a token gesture on behalf of the Arab cause. The Jordanian 3rd Armd. Div. did not try very hard to seek combat, and the Israelis—fully occupied with their drive against the Syrians to the north—almost avoided contact altogether. Ironically, it was the 40th Armd. Bde.—which had fought so stoutly against Syrian invaders three years earlier—which now fought in support of Syria on the Golan. Moving north on the left flank of the Iraqi 3rd Armd. Div., the Jordanians were ambushed by hull-down Israeli tanks of Gen. Laner's 240th Armd. UGDA in the Tel el Mal/Tel Maschera sector on 16 October 1973; and took further casualties among their Centurions on the 18th. At



Syrian girls training as 'commandos'; they are not likely to see action, but all fit young people must undergo military training. (Author's collection)

least 20 Jordanian tanks were lost, and no further active operations were attempted.

The Palestine Liberation Organisation

Since the mid-1950s and especially since 1967 the 'army' most frequently in action against Israel has been that of the PLO. In fact there are several 'armies', since most of the various factions making up the PLO have their own armed forces. The largest is *El Fatah*, the so-called 'Strike Terror' unit created by Yasser Arafat. Whether one labels them guerrillas, commandos or terrorists, the Palestinian irregulars are well-trained and well-armed fighters. Most of their equipment is Russian, but some comes from other Warsaw Pact countries.

In that the PLO attacks are almost exclusively directed against civilian targets, the Palestinians are not 'soldiers' in the conventional Western sense. But their training is of high standard, and most of their instructors have been trained in the Soviet Union. Principal weapons are the Soviet AK-47 assault rifle series and a range of support weapons, from the RPG-7 to the 'Katyusha' heavy rocket launcher. They are perhaps the most experienced users of anti-personnel mines and explosives generally. Most training takes place in the refugee camps of Lebanon and Syria.

PLO raiders often wear a form of uniform—camouflage trousers and jacket of a variety of patterns—in the hope that they will be accorded prisoner-of-war status if captured by the Israelis.

The PLO forces were involved in much more conventional military action during the Lebanese Civil War of 1975–77, and since then against the Israelis. With some artillery and armour support they fought the Lebanese Army, the Christian 'private armies' and, at times, the Syrian Army. After 1977 they fought several actions against Israeli columns sent against the PLO strongholds in southern Lebanon.



Splendid portrait study of a Jordanian Arab Army soldier photographed on guard at the Damascus Gate of the Old City of Jerusalem in the 1960s. Note detail of shemagh, agal, and cap badge. (Author's collection)

Collectively, the PLO factions have about 30,000 full-time fighting men but many others have had military training. The PLO could arm and equip about 100,000 in an all-out mobilisation.

The Palestine Liberation Army

This is a regular army formation and has no connection with the PLO. Created by President Nasser as an auxiliary formation, the PLA has never been stronger than three under-strength brigades, which have been shuttled between Egypt, Syria and Lebanon. Though reasonably well trained and equipped, and including some armour, the PLA was never entrusted with more than support duties during the Middle East wars. After 1973 the PLA brigades became, in effect, part of the Syrian Army, and elements have served in the Lebanon.

Jordanian 3rd Armoured Division

Golan Front, October 1973

40th Armoured Bde. : 2nd Armoured Regt.; 4th Armoured Regt.; 1st Mechanised Bn.; 7th (SP) Artillery Regt.; 5th Engineer Regt.

92nd Armoured Bde. : 12th Armoured Regt.; 13th Armoured Regt.; 3rd Mechanised Bn.; 17th (SP) Artillery Regt.; 6th Engineer Regt.



Bedouin camel trooper of the Desert Patrol—Badieh—photographed in 1956. This crack desert gendarmerie force, raised in 1930/31 by the young Maj. John Glubb, was the first to recruit the fiercely independent Bedouin—as opposed to the urban Haderi—into the Jordanian forces of law and order. It symbolises the type of soldier upon whom the Hashemite monarchy has always been able to depend for courage, resource and complete loyalty. (Author's collection)

The Plates

A1: Corporal, Egyptian Infantry, 1948–49

A one-piece fly-fronted denim overall in light khaki was normal wear for fatigues, training, and combat; artillerymen wore distinctive ox-blood red overalls. British 1937 web equipment and small arms were issued. Insignia were limited to rank devices; for enlisted ranks these were British-style chevrons on the right sleeve, in branch colours—dark blue for infantry, red for artillery, and yellow for cavalry. Differences from the British sequence were four chevrons beneath a brass crown for sergeant major, and brass stars above chevrons for staff sergeants and staff

corporals. Loose berets were the normal service headgear, normally in khaki, but black for artillerymen, red for military police and green for cavalry; enlisted ranks wore no cap badge.

A2: Captain, Egyptian Infantry, 1956

In 1948–49 most officers wore a service dress similar to the British officer's pattern, in winter khaki barathea and summer khaki drill; in practice a bush jacket with integral cloth belt was more usually worn in hot weather. There was also some use of a two-piece denim battledress for field service. This British-style khaki serge battle-dress was introduced for all ranks from about 1954, although some officers had been using privately tailored versions of this as early as 1948–49. In 1952 the revolutionary regime introduced new insignia. The cap badge became a silver eagle, and it is worn here on the dark blue beret introduced for the infantry in that year. The collar bears gilt arm-of-service badges—see Plate H3 for this example. Shoulder strap ranking followed the basic British sequence, but five-point stars replaced 'pips'. The Egyptian crown worn in the ranking of field officers before 1952 was replaced at that time by the revolutionary eagle.

A3: Egyptian infantryman, Sinai, 1967

A new sand-coloured field service outfit was introduced in about 1955, and is still worn; it is the only uniform most Egyptian soldiers are issued. The use of the beret seems to have lapsed with its appearance, except in special units such as paratroop and commando battalions and the Presidential Guard. The new headgear was this simple field cap, worn without insignia; officers have a stiffened version with a flat top and with two ventilating eyelets each side. Insignia on the uniform are still limited to ranking, which is unchanged in form; Egyptian troops never seem to have worn formation signs.

Personal equipment is minimal; the British web belt and anklets were retained for some time and may still be seen on occasion, but the large Soviet Army pattern haversack is the limit of most soldiers' equipment, with a white plastic copy of the US Army canteen carried either clipped to it or slung on the belt. The Soviet helmet, often painted sand yellow or camouflaged, was issued

from about 1955, along with the full range of Soviet small arms. This soldier has an RPDM light machine gun. For the cold desert nights and for winter wear a khaki wool sweater is worn beneath the uniform, and the British-style khaki serge greatcoat remains in use today. An alternative often seen in 1967 was the native *jellaba* robe in a variety of striped patterns.

B1, B2: Egyptian assault infantry, 1973

We believe this to be the first detailed reconstruction in a Western publication of the interesting assault jerkin issued to the Egyptian troops who carried out 'The Great Crossing'; a great deal of research and experiment went into the kit issued to the first, vital assault wave. We take the details from comparison of a number of photos, many rather distant and unclear; but we believe this painting to be accurate in essentials.

The frontal pouches comprise two matching pockets at the front of the hips; a pair of long pockets on the left breast; and one long and two half-length pockets on the right breast. There appear to be two large pouches, 'staggered' in height, on the upper back; and two large matching pockets on the rear of the hips, with a slightly shorter central pouch between them in which the canteen seems normally to be stowed. The box and mask of the gas-mask are stowed in two separate pockets, sometimes with the pipe passing over the shoulder. The toggle fasteners of the rear

King Hussein of Jordan, wearing Arab Army field marshal's summer shirt-sleeve uniform with the Royal Jordanian Armoured Corps beret, inspects cadets of the Royal Military College near Amman. Nearly all his officers are of Bedouin stock; before 1967 some 78 per cent of his people were Palestinian. The cadets wear the *sedara* in brown, piped red; white gorget patches; and a purple shoulder patch edged red, bearing a yellow crown and scroll and a red-flamed white torch rising from three yellow rings. (Author's collection)





Jordanian troops with British-style battledress and equipment manning a 3in. mortar, 1956. The shoulder patch—crossed white sabres on a red square outlined dark blue—is believed to be that of the NCO School. (Author's collection)

pockets may, perhaps, be felt easier to operate by touch alone than the press-studs on the front pouches? The purpose of the apparently folded-up skirts is unknown. A very wide variety of kit can be carried in this simple but highly practical item, ranging from small arms magazines, grenades and first aid kit, to anti-personnel mines and rounds for support weapons. The jerkin is claimed to be (partially?) inflatable for use as a life jacket; it is not easy to see how this works.

A variety of camouflaged helmet covers in apparently random green and brown patterns are seen in colour photos of this campaign. The Soviet helmet is often worn over the reversed field cap, and the field uniform is exactly as in Plate A3. The weapon of B1 is the locally-made 'Port Said' version of the Carl Gustav sub-machine gun. The soldier with the slung AK is unreeling the wire and carrying the guidance sight of the 'Sagger' (Malyutka) ATGM, which is set up for firing on half of its carrying case.

B3: Egyptian Commando, Sinai, 1973

It is hard to be specific about Egyptian special forces units, who are referred to by slightly different names in different sources. There were certainly many Commando Battalions available as spearhead troops in 1973; but at some date they seem to have been divided into Commando and 'Air Cavalry' units. The camouflaged version of the field uniform and helmet cover shown here were certainly used by Commando Battalions in 1973—note large, rather sparse areas of mid-green. The Commandos wear an emerald green beret, and Paratroop Battalions the conventional maroon. Another type of camouflage uniform has been photographed during the 1970s, worn by troops on abseiling exercises with helicopters—'Air Cavalry'. This is in sand yellow with large, rather widely separated areas of green spotting reminiscent of German Waffen-SS patterns. The weapon illustrated is the RPG-7, with its Soviet-made ammunition and accessory back-pack.

C1: Sergeant, 4th Regiment, Jordan Arab Legion; Latrun, May 1948

This single-battalion unit held out against repeated Israeli attacks on the old Latrun police fort in May-June 1948, and inflicted over 1,000 casualties. The Arab Legion flag may be seen in the background. The sergeant—Naib—wears regulation Arab Legion uniform and equipment. The red-and-white *shemagh* is worn with the silver Legion badge pinned to the black goatskin *agal*—cords. The British khaki serge battledress was winter uniform; an almost identical summer version in pale khaki drill lacked the large map pocket on the left thigh. The silver Arab Legion shoulder title is pinned to the strap through a coloured loop identifying the regiment—for the 4th, red and green. Rank chevrons, and 1937 webbing, are British. The weapon is the Thompson SMG with 30-round box magazine. Second World War ribbons are worn by this veteran of the 1941 Anglo-Australian campaign in Syria.

C2: Lieutenant-Colonel commanding 2nd Infantry Regiment, Jordan Arab Legion, mid-1950s

The pale khaki drill summer service dress of officers and warrant officers is worn here with the *sedara* cap of dark blue and red as an undress

alternative to the *shemagh*. The insignia are still in silver: the Arab Legion cap badge, the crown and seven-point star of the Qaid's shoulder ranking, the buttons, the wreathed bayonet infantry arm-of-service collar badges, and the Arab Legion shoulder title pinned through this battalion's green loop. The 1st wore red, the 3rd blue. The green lanyard is also a unit insignia, worn by all ranks. The Sam Browne and brogue shoes are black.

C3: Corporal, 'King Talal' Infantry Brigade, Jordan

Arab Army; Jerusalem, June 1967

This brigade's 2nd ('King Hussein') and 4th ('Prince Hassan') Inf.Bns. resisted the Israeli assault on the Old City with great gallantry; during a fierce night battle on 5/6 June a company of the 4th Bn. defended the Police School and Ammunition Hill literally to the last man, only three wounded surviving to be captured by the

Jordan Arab Army personnel on security duty in Jerusalem during the visit of Pope Paul VI in January 1964. The visible shoulder patch is unidentified; it seems to feature white sabres on a red shield under a yellow crown on a black or dark blue square. Winter serge battledress is worn with British '37 webbing—but note, at right in large photo, magazine pouches for the Carl Gustav sub-machine gun (probably the Egyptian-made Port Said version) carried by two soldiers. (Author's collection)



Israeli 66th Parachute Bn., which itself lost half its strength. Photos show Jordanian infantry in Jerusalem wearing a light khaki denim uniform of British appearance, but apparently of a much darker shade than the khaki drill summer battle-dress of the late 1940s. The webbing is basically British '37 pattern; but note the two sets of triple clip pouches on the belt, which appear to be of soft fabric, and were locally made to accommodate the clips for the .30 Garand M1, which was now the main infantry weapon. By the early 1960s the shoulder strap loops identifying battalions of the old Arab Legion had given way to brigade shoulder patches, but these were never worn on combat clothing in action. The rank chevrons of corporal—Areef—are worn on a brassard on the right only.

D1: 1st Lieutenant, 1st Mechanised Infantry Bn., 40th Armoured Brigade; Jordan Arab Army, late 1970s

After the 1973 war large quantities of US Army material were supplied to Jordan. The combat dress, helmet and cover, and M16 rifle are all from US sources. The beret is in the red-brown of the infantry: other colours worn are black (armour), dark blue (artillery), mid-blue (engineers), maroon (special forces) and green (Royal Guards). The general service beret was khaki until the late 1970s but is reportedly black at the time of writing. The cap badge, unchanged in design since the Arab Legion days, changed from silver to gold in 1956, as did all other metal insignia. The 'Jeish-al-Arabi' shoulder title and the Mulazim Awal's two rank stars are worn here in yellow embroidered form on slip-overs on the combat jacket shoulder straps. A plastic name tag is worn on the right breast by officers. In the background is an M113 camouflaged in broad diagonal stripes of sand and brown over olive drab; note red-over-yellow disc of 40th Armd.Bde. formation sign.

D2: Lance-Corporal, Supply and Transport branch, 4th Mechanised Division; Jordan Arab Army, late 1970s

The winter service dress is illustrated: a shirt and slacks in a dark sand shade, worn with an olive sweater with olive fabric reinforcement at shoul-

ders and forearms, applied shoulder straps in shirt fabric, and internal pockets with external knit flaps. The khaki general service beret bears the national cap badge in gold. The shoulder straps of all ranks bear the national shoulder title in gold. At the top of the sleeves are dark-blue-on-yellow branch-of-service titles. As a member of divisional troops, this Jundi Awal wears the 4th Mech.Div. patch above his single rank chevron: green square, yellow border; red shield, yellow border and crown; yellow lion mask. Between 1968 and 1973 the Jordan Arab Army was re-organised from the old brigade structure into five divisions—1st and 2nd Infantry, 3rd Armoured, 4th Mechanised, and 5th Armoured. We are unable to give brigade allocation within these divisions in most cases, and a good deal of movement between formations seems to have taken place.

D3: Brigadier commanding 40th Armoured Brigade; Jordan Arab Army, 1973

Seen here conducting a 'sand table exercise', the commander of Jordan's élite tank formation wears the interim spring and autumn service dress—as winter, but without the sweater. In summer a short-sleeved pale khaki drill shirtsleeve uniform of similar design is worn. The Royal Jordanian Armoured Corps beret bears the usual badge; Zaim's ranking is in yellow embroidery on stiff applied shoulder straps, with the usual national title. Gorget patches are worn on the collar, a name tab in black and white plastic on the right breast, and medal ribbons on the left. On both upper sleeves is the formation sign of 40th Armoured: a yellow square, bordered red, bearing a red Hashemite crown over a green wreath tied with red ribbons, around a black fist holding a black spiked mace.

E1, E2: Syrian infantry, winter combat dress, 1970s
Both figures are taken from colour photographs of Syrian troops in the mountainous border country behind the Golan Heights; given the Syrian passion for security, rigid even by Arab standards, there is little we can add to what is shown here. Both figures wear rubber winter boots. The olive uniform has an obviously 'Soviet bloc' flavour to it. The interesting snow-suit has

zippers down the outside of both legs, and four pockets; a fly covers the front zipper, and the fur-lined hood can be unzipped down the middle, as here, to lie flat on the shoulders in a 'butterfly' shape. Equipment is limited to web belts—usually of British 1937 pattern, but sometimes of US Army type—and the ubiquitous Soviet haversack and helmet.

E3: Syrian infantry, summer combat dress, 1970s?

There is a persistent written report that Syrian troops have received this desert version of the British DPM camouflage fatigues; and it has certainly been supplied to Saudi Arabia. Whether it has been purchased by, or passed from the original customer to Syria cannot, at the time of writing, be confirmed by photographs, but it is included on this understanding.

E4: Specialist Sergeant, Syrian infantry, summer combat dress, 1970s

In 1967 Syrian troops seem to have worn khaki drill clothing, but by the 1970s the olive drab fatigue suit and visored field cap seem to have been general issue. Nevertheless, colour photos show infantry—identifiable by the green beret, with the brass eagle cap badge of all enlisted ranks—wearing both olive and dark khaki drill fatigues, sometimes in the same unit. Belts are usually of British '37 pattern; haversacks, helmets and small arms are Soviet. Some sources have described NCO chevrons as being white or silver, but here we follow a Syrian Army colour chart. Note stiffened backing in arm-of-service colour.

Royal Jordanian Armoured Corps crew with their M47 Patton of the newly-formed 40th Armd.Bde. early in the 1960s. They wear drab khaki denim overalls with British webbing and revolvers; one has a Sten gun. This unit, equipped with the later M48, fought well in 1967. Re-equipped with Centurions, it won a decisive victory over Syrian invaders during the 1970–71 civil war, and fought briefly on the Golan Heights in 1973. (Christopher F. Foss)





Jordanian infantryman of the 1960s, wearing a lightweight denim combat uniform, basically British webbing, and carrying the US 3.5in. rocket launcher. (Author's collection)

F1: PLA bagpiper, 1970s

An odd reminder that the PLA is structured in a conventional military way, with such adornments as bands and colour-parties; this musician is taken from a colour photo in an Italian magazine article. The bagpipes, streamer and cords are in Palestinian colours. The PLA's scarlet beret bears a brass badge virtually identical to the eagle of the Syrian Army. This camouflage pattern is one of three main types in PLA use; it somewhat resembles the Egyptian type, with large, rather widely spaced areas of mid-green and light chocolate brown on a sand yellow ground. The belt is British, scrubbed pale khaki; the trousers are gathered at the ankle over black boots.

F2: PLO guerrilla, 1970s

A very wide variety of camouflaged and olive drab fatigue garments of many different origins is worn by the PLO alongside civilian clothing. This pattern is seen in several colour photos, including

an article in *LIFE* magazine of 12 June 1970. The shemagh patterned in dark blue, black, or—less commonly—red, is the usual headgear; various olive drab, khaki drill or camouflaged visored field caps are also worn. The typical equipment rig of classic Communist design has three large frontal pouches, and two smaller pouches on each triangular side-piece—see small rear view. This PLO man has stripped his Kalashnikov, and, holding the cleaning-rod with jag in his right hand, is forcing the return spring assembly back into the bolt/piston group.

F3: Palestinian recruit, 1970s

Taken from a PLO-issued picture, this figure shows a PLA recruit in training in Lebanon or Syria under PLA instructors. Note badge on camouflaged cap; very second-hand olive drab fatigues, of uncertain origin; and boots of canvas and rubber, like those of F4, with a double-buckle ankle flap obscured here by the trousers. The weapon is the Simonov semi-automatic carbine, and the recruit holds a ten-round charger for it.

F4: PLA soldier, 1970s

The appearance of this man is a reminder that the PLA is now virtually part of the Syrian Army. The camouflage suit is not French-made but is of a pattern strongly recalling the French 1950s-60s combat fatigues.

G1: Sergeant, Special Service Group 'Saiqa', Jordan Arab Army, late 1970s

The first of two battalions of this crack airborne unit was raised in the aftermath of the 1967 disaster, and served with distinction in the 1970-71 civil war against the PLO. Note national cap badge on maroon beret; maroon backing for cloth parachute wings and white chevrons; maroon shield, yellow wings and crown, and white bayonet of Group patch—this, like the chevrons, is worn on the right sleeve only. The uniform is the US Army leaf-pattern camouflage suit. A light khaki-brown scarf is sometimes worn by Special Service Group personnel.

G2: Mascot handler, 2nd Armoured Car Regt., Jordan Arab Legion, 1955

After the concentration of the previously dispersed armoured car companies into the 1st Armd. Car Regt. in the aftermath of the 1948-49 war a second regiment was formed. Like the first, its organisation was based on reconnaissance troops each of two Marmon-Herrington Mk IVF armoured cars and two short-wheelbase Land Rovers with Bren guns mounted. The 3rd Tank Regt., formed gradually in 1952-55, eventually had two squadrons of 20pdr. Charioteer and one squadron of 17pdr. Archer SP guns. These units wore the type of yellow shoulder patch illustrated, with different regimental motifs: crossed lances for the 1st, the hawk's head for the 2nd, and a scorpion for the 3rd. The conventional winter battledress and British '37 webbing are worn with the *shemagh*, *agal*, silver cap badge and silver shoulder title. Note regimental yellow lanyard visible on left shoulder and pocket, and pistol lanyard carried across to right shoulder.

G3: Syrian lieutenant-general, 1970s

The infantry-green beret is now worn by all Syrian general officers, with this ornate wire cap badge. The uniform in winter is a lightweight

khaki battledress blouse and slacks, illustrated in a photo elsewhere in this book, with stiff French-type shoulder boards in arm-of-service colour with applied gold metal ranking; again, generals seem to wear green boards. The red stripe is unexplained but is worn by all officers in the group photo from which we take this figure.

G4: Staff Sergeant, Royal Armoured Corps, Jordan Arab Army, 1970s

Patton tank commander in US Army-pattern 'bone dome' CVC helmet and US olive drab fatigues and webbing. No formation signs are worn with combat dress; officers wear embroidered ranking on shoulder strap slip-over loops, and NCOs wear chevrons on the right only—here, the three chevrons and yellow-and-green Hashemite crown of a Naqib.

G5: Egyptian major-general, 1967

Khaki barathea service dress cap with red band,



PLO guerrilla in 'Fatahland'—the southern Lebanon refuge—peering across the border into Israeli territory. The camouflage fatigues, of French appearance, are in fact made in East Germany; this man has a Palestinian shoulder title temporarily attached. The ubiquitous Kalashnikov series is the main personal weapon of most PLO groups; Degtyarev light machine guns and RPG-7 rocket launchers are the most common support weapons. During their long and ruthless campaign against Israeli settlements the PLO have become skilled at fieldcraft, but their losses have been high. (Author's collection)

brown leather peak and strap, and gold-embroidered wire badge on rich green patch; the peak has two rows of gold lotus-flower embroidery, which also edges the badge of an eagle over crossed sabre and baton. The four-button 'bush jacket' in light khaki drill has long sleeves buttoned at the wrist and four pleated patch pockets; the lotus-flower motif is repeated on the gorget patches. The shoulder boards are very like the Syrian general's pattern, but the crossed sabres are replaced in Egypt by crossed sabre and baton. The jacket has an integral cloth belt with a two-claw gold frame buckle.

H: Insignia:

(1) Egypt: lieutenant-colonel's ranking, embroidered shoulder strap loop for khaki drill field

Men of the Palestine Liberation Army—a regular military force, not to be confused with the PLO fedayeen. Armed and equipped largely from Soviet sources, the PLA brigades were attached to Egyptian and Syrian divisions during the 1967 and 1973 wars. (Author's collection)

uniform. The sequence is one, two and three stars for lieutenants and captain; an eagle, and an eagle with one, two and three stars for major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel and brigadier; and an eagle and crossed sabre and baton with one, two and three stars between them for the general officer ranks. (2) Egypt: armoured troops collar badge worn by officers on battledress blouse and service dress tunic from 1952. (3) Egypt: infantry collar badge, worn as above, from 1952. (4) Egypt: Presidential Guard; helmet of Soviet manufacture painted in blue and red of this unit, which wears blue berets with red bands, and with brass unit cap badge welded in place.

(5) Syria: collar badge worn by officers on battledress blouse, pinned through patch of arm-of-service colour—here infantry, on dark green.

(6) Syria: armoured troops officer's BD blouse collar badge, worn on grey patch. (7) Syria: lieutenant-general's shoulder board, showing ranking motifs used throughout sequence: sub-



alters, one to three stars; field officers, an eagle, and an eagle with one and two stars; brigadier, an eagle and three stars; major-general, eagle and crossed sabres; lieutenant-general, as here; general, as here but two stars side by side; field marshal, as general but wreath round sabres. (8,9,10) Syria: left shoulder patches of Commandos, Frontier Guards and Paratroopers. These are taken from a Syrian Army colour chart, but no photographs showing them being worn have been found as yet. (11) Syria: infantry divisional flag. (12) Syria: armoured divisional flag. (13) Syria: Corporal's chevrons, infantry, both arms. Backing is in arm-of-service colour—other examples are dark blue for artillery, light brown for engineers, yellow for frontier guard. A Syrian Army colour chart shows yellow braid, for infantry at least—other written sources specify general use of white. One and two down-pointing chevrons identify private first class and corporal; two upward-pointing, sergeant; three, three over a bar, and three over one and two stars identify the various grades of senior and specialist sergeants. (14) Syria: senior warrant officer, worn on left shoulder on arm-of-service backing; junior and intermediate grades have one and two stars.

(15) Jordan Arab Legion: shoulder strap loop of 5th Inf. Regt. (16) 7th Inf. Regt. (17) 8th Inf. Regt. (18) 9th Inf. Regt. (19) 15th Inf. Regt. (20) Jordan: cap badge worn in silver until 1956, gold thereafter. (21) Jordan: services, as opposed to combat arms, wear shoulder titles—here, engineers. (22) Jordan: signals shoulder title. (23) Jordan: officer's shoulder strap insignia, here lieutenant-colonel. Sequence is one, two and three stars for subalterns; crown for major, crown and one, two and three stars for lieutenant-colonel, colonel and brigadier; star above crossed sabres for major-general, crown above sabres for lieutenant-general, crown and star above sabres for general; crown above wreathed sabres and without shoulder title, field marshal. (24) Jordan: divisional patches were introduced c. 1968–70, and are worn by divisional staff and services, brigade patches being retained by combat units within divisions. This is 1st Inf. Div. (25) Jordan: 2nd Inf. Div. (26) Jordan: Royal Guards. (27) Jordan: Inf. brigade within 1st Inf. Div.—believed either 'Qadisiya', 'Hattin' or 'Aliya'. (28) Jordan:



PLA soldier wearing that force's red beret (see Plate F) and a khaki battledress, probably from Syrian surplus. The ribbon—blue, with triple white/red/white stripes—is that of the Syrian Medal of Courage. Note Palestinian shoulder patch, and RPD series light machine gun. (Author's collection)

Special Security troops—maroon berets. (29) Jordan: 60th Armd. Bde. within 3rd Armd. Div. (30) Jordan: unidentified tank bde. within 4th Mech. Div.; incorporation of ribbon of Order of Kawkab suggests fine combat record, so possibly bde. expanded from 1967 independent 12th Armd. Regt. (31) Jordan: 3rd Armd. Div.

Further reading:

Men-at-Arms 127, *The Israeli Army in the Middle East Wars 1948–73*, John Laffin; Osprey, London

Vanguard 19, *Armour of the Middle East Wars 1948–78*, Steven J. Zaloga; Osprey, London

Also:

The Hashemite Arab Army 1908–1979, Brig. S. A. El-Edroos; The Publishing Committee, Amman, Jordan
The War of Atonement, Chaim Herzog; Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London

No Victor, No Vanquished, E. O'Ballance; Barrie & Jenkins, London

Various issues, *Born in Battle* series; Eshel-Dramit Ltd, Hod Hasharon, Israel

Notes sur les planches en couleur

A1 Combinaison portée d'habitude en combat, avec équipement anglais; chevrons de grade, bleus pour l'infanterie. **A2** Le régime révolutionnaire introduisit un aigle d'argent comme insigne de la coiffure et le bérét bleu foncé d'infanterie en 1952; battledress de style anglais pour tous les grades à partir de 1954; les officiers portent des insignes de col en laiton, variant selon les différentes armes. Echelle de grades similaire à celle de l'armée anglaise mais avec des étoiles au lieu de 'pips' et un aigle au lieu de la couronne. **A3** Uniforme de campagne pour tous les grades, introduit vers 1955. Simple, de couleur sable, il se porte avec un équipement minimum—d'habitude seulement un havresac et un casque russe et une copie de la gourde américaine. Les chevrons de grade sont les seuls insignes.

B1, B2 D'après photos, reconstruction d'un gilet d'assaut utilisé pour la traversée du canal de Suez en 1973, avec de nombreuses poches pour transporter les munitions, les grenades, le masque à gaz, des mines, un nécessaire de premier secours, gamelle, etc. Au premier plan, un missile anti-tank 'Malyutka'. Les casques russes ont plusieurs différentes housses de camouflage. **B3** Version camouflée de la tenue de campagne, portée par les commandos; lance-missile RPG-7.

C1 Battledress et équipement de style anglais; la boucle d'épaule identifie l'unité, avec l'insigne argent de la Légion Arabe épingle dessus. **C2** Uniforme d'été d'officier avec le calot sedara; la couleur de la boucle de patte d'épaule et de la fourragère identifie l'unité. **C3** Equipment mi-anglais mi-américain, ainsi que les armes; l'uniforme a une version en toile plus légère de la battle-dress anglaise, mais apparemment assemblé comme une combinaison. Les chevrons de grade de type anglais sont les seuls insignes portés au combat.

D1 Vêtements américains, équipement et armes distribués dans les années 70. Bérét marron de l'infanterie avec l'insigne national, doré depuis 1956. L'insigne de grade et l'insigne national d'épaule, en fil jaune brodé sur les pattes d'épaules quand c'est sur la tenue de combat, est fait de métal doré pour la tenue habillée. **D2** Tenue habillée d'hiver. Bérét khaki pour les troupes des services généraux. Insigne de division (tête de lion jaune sur un bouclier rouge, couronne jaune, carré vert) porté sous le titre identifiant l'arme, en bleu et jaune en haut de la manche. **D3** Bérét des Blindés; uniforme en manches de chemise de demi-saison avec l'insigne d'épaule de la 40ème Brigade Blindée (carré jaune, poing noir tenant une masse, lauriers verts) et indication de grade habituelle sur la patte d'épaule; pièces de col des généraux et colonels d'état-major.

E1, E2 Deux versions de l'uniforme d'hiver pour les hauteurs du Golan, d'après des photos en couleur. **E3** Un rapport affirme que cette version beige-désert de la tenue camouflée anglaise a été achetée par la Syrie mais nous n'en n'avons pas trouvé de photos. **E4** D'après photos: bérét vert d'infanterie avec l'aigle, insigne national; une chemise vert olive, ainsi que les pantalons; un armement et équipement russes; quelques vieilles ceintures anglaises sont encore en cours.

F1, F4 L'ALP est une armée régulière dont les brigades sont attachées à l'armée syrienne. Elles utilisent ces deux modèles de camouflage avec des bretets écarlates et des insignes très similaires à ceux de l'armée syrienne. **F2** On porte des types très variés de camouflage, y compris celui-ci, qui rappelle celui de la Waffen-SS. Equipment typiquement d'origine communiste, et le shemagh porté en coiffure. **F3** On pense que c'est une recrue de l'ALP au Liban: treillis usagé vert olive, casquette de campagne camouflée avec un insigne en forme d'aigle, et fusil SKS.

G1 Vêtements américains camouflés avec le motif 'feuillage'; bérét marron pourpré des troupes aéroportées; insigne d'épaule du Special Service Group. **G2** Insigne régimental d'épaule en forme de tête de faucon, sur le carré jaune des troupes motorisées, porté sur battledress anglaise; la fourragère jaune du régiment est juste visible sur l'épaule gauche. **G3** Les généraux portent un bérét vert d'infanterie avec un insigne spécial. La battledress légère est la tenue de sortie d'hiver des officiers, avec des pattes d'épaules rigides de style français. **G4** Treillis américain vert olive, et sangles assorties, plus casque de tankiste; chevrons de grade de style anglais sur la manche droite. **G5** Casquette de style anglais, khaki avec une bande rouge pour les généraux; elle est portée avec une veste de brousse beige clair à quatre poches.

H Insignes. Nous n'avons malheureusement pas la place de les traduire tous. Les légendes en Anglais sont faciles à comprendre, car la plupart indiquent seulement les unités ou les grades.

Farbtafeln

A1 Einteilige Anzüge, normalerweise im Kampf getragen, mit britischer Ausrüstung; Rangwinkel in blau für die Infanterie. **A2** Das revolutionäre Regime führte das silberne Adler-Mützenabzeichen und dunkelblaues Beret im Jahr 1952 ein; 'battledress' im britischen Stil für alle Ränge von ca. 1954 an—Offiziere trugen Waffengattungsabzeichen aus Messing. Rangabzeichenfolge ist ähnlich der der britischen Armee, jedoch mit Sternen anstelle von 'pips' und dem Adler statt der Krone. **A3** Einfache sandfarbene Felduniform für alle Ränge ca. 1955 eingeführt, mit einem Minimum an Ausrüstung getragen—gewöhnlicherweise nur einem russischen Rucksack und Helm sowie einer Nachahmung einer US Feldflasche. Rangwinkel sind die einzigen getragenen Abzeichen.

B1, B2 Rekonstruierung nach Fotos von einer interessanten beladbaren Angriffsweste, benutzt für die Suezüberquerung in 1973, mit vielen Beuteln für Munition, Granaten, Gasmaske, Minen, Erste Hilfepackung, Feldflasche etc. Im Vordergrund 'Malyutka' Panzerabwehrakete. Russische Helme haben mehrere unterschiedliche Tarnbedeckungen. **B3** Getarnte Version der Felduniform, von 'Commandos' getragen; RPG-7 Raketenabschussgerät.

C1 'Battledress' und Ausrüstung im britischen Stil; Schulterriemenabzeichen lässt die Einheit erkennen, das silberne Abzeichen der arabischen Legion hindurchgesteckt. **C2** Offiziers-Sommeruniform mit sedara Mütze; die Farbe des Schulterriemenschildes und Taljereep lässt die Einheit erkennen. **C3** Teils britische, teils US Ausrüstung und Waffen; die Uniform ist die leichte Denim Version des britischen 'battledress', jedoch anscheinend als Einteiler hergestellt. Die Rangwinkel im britischen Stil sind die einzigen in der Schlacht getragenen Abzeichen.

D1 Amerikanische Kleidung, Ausrüstung und Waffen, ausgegeben in den 1970ern. Beret in Infanterie-braun mit nationalem Mützenabzeichen, seit 1956 golden. Rangabzeichen und nationale Schulterabzeichen aus gesticktem, gelbem Faden auf den Schulterklappen getragen, wenn in Kampfuniform, aus goldenem Metal, wenn in Dienstuniform. **D2** Winterdienstuniform. Khakifarbenes Beret des Allgemeindienstes Divisionsabzeichen (Löwenmaske in gelb auf rotem Schild, gelbe Krone, grünes Quadrat) unterhalb des Waffengattungstitels in blau und gelb oben am Ärmel getragen. **D3** Beret des Panzerkorps; Frühjahrs/Herbst Hemdsärmeluniform mit den Schulterabzeichen der 40. Panzerbrigade (gelbes Quadrat, schwarze Faust, die den Streitkolben im grünen Kranz hält) und normale Schulterklappenrangordnung; Kragenspiegel für Generäle und Stabsoberten.

E1, E2 Zwei Winteruniformversionen für die Golan-Höhen, von Farbfotos entnommen. **E3** Ein schriftlicher Bericht behauptet, dass diese wüstenfarbene Version der britischen Tarnkleidung von Syrien gekauft wurde, jedoch sind keine Fotos bekannt. **E4** Von Fotografen: Infanteriegrünes Beret mit dem nationalen Adler-Mützenabzeichen, olivfarbenes Hemd und Hosen, russische Waffen und Ausrüstung—einige alte britische Gürtel noch benutzt.

F1, F4 Die PLA ist eine reguläre Streitmacht, dessen Brigaden der syrischen Armee angeschlossen sind. Diese zwei Tarnmuster werden, mit scharlachroten Berets und Abzeichen dem syrischen Armeotyp sehr ähnlich, benutzt. **F2** Viele Arten der Tarnkleidung, einschließlich dieser, die an die Waffen-SS erinnert, werden getragen. Typische kommunistische Ausrüstung, shemagh Kopfbedeckung. **F3** Man glaubt, dass dies ein PLA-Rekrut im Libanon ist; gebrauchter olivfarbener Arbeitsanzug, Tarnfeldmütze mit Adlerabzeichen, SKS Karabiner.

G1 US 'Blattmuster' Tarnkleidung; kastanienbraunes Luftlandetruppenberet; Schulterabzeichen der Special Service Group. **G2** Regimentales Schulterabzeichen eines Habichtkopfes auf dem üblichen gelben Quadrat der mechanisierten Truppen, am alten britischen 'battledress' getragen: der gelbe regimentale Taljereep ist gerade noch an der linken Schulter zu sehen.

G3 Die Generäle tragen das Infanteriegrüne Beret mit Spezialabzeichen. Leichter 'battledress' ist die Winterdienstuniform für Offiziere, mit Schultertafeln im französischen Stil. **G4** US olivfarbene Arbeitsanzüge, Gürtelzeug, Panzermannschaftshelm; Rangwinkel im britischen Stil am rechten Ärmel. **G5** Mütze nach britischem Modell in khaki mit rotem Band für Generäle, mit heller sandfarbener Vierertaschen-Buschjacke getragen.

H Abzeichen: Bedauerlicherweise ist nicht genug Platz vorhanden, um alle diese Posten zu übersetzen. Die Untertitel in englischer Sprache sollten selbsterklärend sein, da es meistens einfach Einheits- oder Rangtitel sind.

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